The Latest Chemical Attack: A Policy Challenge
The Russian-Turkish entente has clearly impacted Ankara’s response to the April 2018 chemical weapons attack in the town of Douma, in Eastern Ghouta. The Turkish government has pursued a measured response. Turkey supported the American drafted United Nations Security Resolution that called for the establishment of a new investigative mechanism to determine the perpetrator of the chemical attack. The resolution did not endorse military action and instead echoed the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ call for the “Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to immediately investigate this case.” In any case, Russia vetoed the resolution and tabled its own resolution, albeit with a poison pill that allowed for the UNSC (where Russia has a veto) the responsibility of assigning blame for the attack. The United States, France, and UK all used their veto.
Ankara has since called for calm, warning against unintended escalation between Russia and the United States. Turkish Prime Minister, Binali Yildirim, criticized Moscow and Washington for “fighting like street bullies” and encouraged “countries [to] join hands to ensure the territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq by eliminating terror groups on these lands.” Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusolgu, adopted a stronger line, telling a think tank audience “The Assad regime should absolutely leave power in Syria.” A week prior, Cavusoglu suggested that “Assad [would] eventually lose” and framed Turkish interests as ensuring Syria remain united—another overt reference to the Kurdish issue.
The tension between Turkish antipathy for Assad and Ankara’s partnership with Moscow to facilitate cross-border military operations aimed at the YPG is clear. The Turkish government has to manage tensions with Moscow, lest otherwise risk complicating its open-ended military presence in northern Aleppo and Idlib. In many ways, Ankara’s vulnerability is similar to that of the United States, which also has troops in country, and is reliant on a de-escalation mechanism to prevent unwanted clashes with Iran, Russia, and the regime. The implications for the United States are clear: Ankara, a NATO ally, has adopted a transactional relationship with Russia and its traditional allies. This posture does not forebode a shift in “axis” whereby Turkey will abandon its traditional alliance structure in favor of a Russian dominated region. Instead, it shows that Ankara now treats Moscow in much the same way as the United States: a transactional partner.
The question, then, is what happens after the US-led strikes in Syria end? The roots of the Turkish-Russian relationship will remain, as will Bashar’s grip on power. Turkey is committed to working through Russia to secure its interests, and has spoken out against American goals in northeastern Syria. These dynamics are certain to continue, even if Turkey speaks out in favor of the forthcoming military strike. The changes over the past year in Syria have resulted in a durable Turkish-Russian relationship in Syria and a number of overlapping interests. Ankara’s handling of the latest chemical strike clearly shows how Turkish policy has shifted since 2013, and that in the coming weeks the drivers of Turkish policy aren’t likely to change.
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/me ... UU.twitter
μεγάλη στροφή από την τουρκική εξωτερική πολιτική, υπέρ της Ρωσίας. Φαίνεται πως η εξέλιξη του πολέμου στη Συρία,
έδεσε αμφίδρομα την Τουρκία και την Ρωσία, ώστε η μία να έχει πλέον ανάγκη την άλλη. Η συνεργασία τους, παρά τα όποια αγκάθια,
φαίνεται να βγάζει καρπούς σιγά-σιγά.
ωραίο παιχνιδάκι δεν είναι?
δεν υπάρχει
