Namrail έγραψε: 24 Νοέμ 2020, 19:21
Δεν γράφω προσωπικά για σένα μωρέ μαλέα. Γράφω για τον γενικό πληθυσμό. Επειδή εσένα δηλαδή μάσκα σου δημιουργεί προβλήματα απαιτεί την παύση της χρήσης της ως γενικό μετρό, την ώρα που οι ειδικοί λένε ότι βοηθάει; Δηλαδή κάπου έλεος
Ρε Αρίστο, οι συνθήκες συνωστισμού μπορούν να προκύψουν ανά πάσα στιγμή μέσα στην καθημερινότητα. Και δεν σου μιλάω μόνο για κλειστούς χώρους, αλλά και για τα κέντρα των πόλεων, την αναμονή στις στάσεις,τις ουρές έξω από υπηρεσίες κλπ. Με δεδομένο αυτό, αλλά και επειδή τα πράγματα από ένα σημείο και μετά ξέφυγαν με τη διάδοση του ιού, αποφάσισαν οι προφέσορες την καθολική χρήση της μάσκας. Τώρα προφανώς και είτε φοράς είτε όχι μάσκα, όταν κάνεις μόνος σου μια βόλτα το σκύλο, δεν έχει σημασία.Αρίστος έγραψε: 24 Νοέμ 2020, 20:14
Ειπα πως η μασκα ειναι σωστη σε μερη με συνωστισμο και ακατανοητη οπου δεν υπαρχει συνωστισμος.
Βγαζει ενα ζευγαρι το σκυλο του για βολτα, γιατι χρειαζεται να φορανε μασκα;
Αρίστος έγραψε: 24 Νοέμ 2020, 20:14Namrail έγραψε: 24 Νοέμ 2020, 19:21
Δεν γράφω προσωπικά για σένα μωρέ μαλέα. Γράφω για τον γενικό πληθυσμό. Επειδή εσένα δηλαδή μάσκα σου δημιουργεί προβλήματα απαιτεί την παύση της χρήσης της ως γενικό μετρό, την ώρα που οι ειδικοί λένε ότι βοηθάει; Δηλαδή κάπου έλεος
Ειπα πως η μασκα ειναι σωστη σε μερη με συνωστισμο και ακατανοητη οπου δεν υπαρχει συνωστισμος.
Βγαζει ενα ζευγαρι το σκυλο του για βολτα, γιατι χρειαζεται να φορανε μασκα;
.
Λάθος συλλογιστική, μάσκα μέχρι να δείξουν τα επιδημιολογικά δεδομένα ότι δεν υπάρχει πια θέμα, όχι μέχρι να εμβολιαστούν όλοι. Το 90% αποτελεσματικότητα δεν είναι πρόβλημα αφού η ανοσία αγέλης μάλλον απαιτεί αρκετά χαμηλότερο νούμερο. Δεν προσπαθούμε να εξαλείψουμε τον ιό, κάτι τέτοιο θα ήταν δυνατό μόνο αν καταλείπει μόνιμη ή πολύ μακρόχρονη ανοσία.talaipwros έγραψε: 21 Νοέμ 2020, 11:21Η αποτελεσματικότητα ειναι 90% οχι 100%
Επισης ειναι δύσκολο να ξερεις αν ο αλλος που δε φοραει μασκα εκανε ή οχι το εμβόλιο διότι υπαρχουν αρκετοι ψεκασμένοι που το αρνούνται και θα πουν ψέμματα.
Οποτε ολοι μασκα μεχρι να εμβολιαστουν σχεδον ολοι
Φαίνεται πάντως πως τελικά η αλήθεια βρισκόταν κάπου στην μέση, δηλαδή το καλοκαίρι ή μάλλον όσο έχει ζέστη μπορείς να είσαι ανοιχτός χωρίς ιδιαίτερα προβλήματα, το έκανε και η Σουηδία. Τον χειμώνα, χωρίς να έχεις αναπτύξει ανοσία αγέλης, δεν μπορείς. Τα δεδομένα της Σουηδίας είναι ξεκάθαρα και για τις δύο πιο πάνω διαπιστώσεις.Echelon έγραψε: 25 Νοέμ 2020, 08:15 Τελικά μετά από 10 ημέρες αφού δημιουργήθηκε το θέμα, μάθαμε αν η Σουηδία πράγματι εφαρμόζει σκληρό Lockdown; Εγώ διαβάζω κάτι περί συστάσεων για αποστάσεις συν απαγόρευση πώλησης αλκοόλ μετά τις 22:00 στα μπαρ, τα οποία παραμένουν ανοιχτά. Μιλάμε για ακραία μέτρα.
Όχι ακριβώς. Έχουν να κάνουν τόσο με την στατιστική κατάγραφή όσο και με μια σχεδόν ατέλειωτη σειρά άλλων παραγόντων. Γι αυτό και μόνο οι καφενετζήδες μετράνε νεκρούς και τους αντιπαραβάλλουν με έναν μόνο παράγοντα κατά το δοκούν. Η επιστήμη χρησιμοποιεί πολύ πιο σύνθετα μοντέλα ανάλυσης της πανδημίας.Green Dragon έγραψε: 25 Νοέμ 2020, 08:22Φαίνεται πάντως πως τελικά η αλήθεια βρισκόταν κάπου στην μέση, δηλαδή το καλοκαίρι ή μάλλον όσο έχει ζέστη μπορείς να είσαι ανοιχτός χωρίς ιδιαίτερα προβλήματα, το έκανε και η Σουηδία. Τον χειμώνα, χωρίς να έχεις αναπτύξει ανοσία αγέλης, δεν μπορείς. Τα δεδομένα της Σουηδίας είναι ξεκάθαρα και για τις δύο πιο πάνω διαπιστώσεις.Echelon έγραψε: 25 Νοέμ 2020, 08:15 Τελικά μετά από 10 ημέρες αφού δημιουργήθηκε το θέμα, μάθαμε αν η Σουηδία πράγματι εφαρμόζει σκληρό Lockdown; Εγώ διαβάζω κάτι περί συστάσεων για αποστάσεις συν απαγόρευση πώλησης αλκοόλ μετά τις 22:00 στα μπαρ, τα οποία παραμένουν ανοιχτά. Μιλάμε για ακραία μέτρα.
Μια παρατήρηση: Θεωρείστε δεδομένο ότι και στην Σουηδία, όπως σε όλες τις χώρες, γίνονται πολύ περισσότερα τεστς σε σχέση με το πρώτο κύμα. Δηλαδή αυτήν την στιγμή οι Σουηδοί εξακολουθούν να υπολείπονται σε πραγματικά κρούσματα της άνοιξης. Παρακολουθήστε τους θανάτους, είναι το πιο αξιόπιστο κριτήριο.
πατησιωτης έγραψε: 25 Νοέμ 2020, 08:03Αρίστος έγραψε: 24 Νοέμ 2020, 20:14Namrail έγραψε: 24 Νοέμ 2020, 19:21
Δεν γράφω προσωπικά για σένα μωρέ μαλέα. Γράφω για τον γενικό πληθυσμό. Επειδή εσένα δηλαδή μάσκα σου δημιουργεί προβλήματα απαιτεί την παύση της χρήσης της ως γενικό μετρό, την ώρα που οι ειδικοί λένε ότι βοηθάει; Δηλαδή κάπου έλεος
Ειπα πως η μασκα ειναι σωστη σε μερη με συνωστισμο και ακατανοητη οπου δεν υπαρχει συνωστισμος.
Βγαζει ενα ζευγαρι το σκυλο του για βολτα, γιατι χρειαζεται να φορανε μασκα;
.
Τα ιατρικά πρωτόκολλα υπολογίζουν και την πιθανότητα λαθών,αβλεψιων και παραλείψεων.Ο μόνος σίγουρος τρόπος να μην υπάρχει αβεβαιότητα και λάθος στην εφαρμογή ή μη της μάσκας είναι να είναι μόνιμα.
Επίσης σημαντικό στοιχείοThe heterogeneous mortality effects of the COVID-19 pandemic reflect differences in how well countries have managed the pandemic and the resilience and preparedness of the health and social care system.
Sweden had the longest duration of excess deaths but had smaller weekly increases in deaths than countries such as England and Wales, Spain, Scotland, Italy and Belgium. As a result, the overall mortality toll in Sweden, in terms of relative increase and deaths per 100,000 people, fell between those of countries with low-to-moderate effects (for example, Portugal and Switzerland) and countries with extreme tolls (for example, Spain and England and Wales).
In contrast to Italy and Spain, the overall (all-cause) number of excess deaths was smaller than deaths assigned to COVID-19 in France, Belgium and Switzerland. This situation might have arisen because some countries have assigned any death in a person with confirmed or suspect SARS-CoV-2 infection to COVID-19; some of these deaths might have been in patients with multiple existing chronic conditions who already had a high risk of dying7,15,16,17. Finally, there might have been a reduction in deaths from influenza and other respiratory infections because of reduced contact among people18,19 as well as a decline in traffic injuries, falls and violence as people spent more time at home20. As a result of these differences, although France and Spain have reported similar numbers of deaths assigned to COVID-19, all-cause mortality increased by twice as much in Spain as in France. These variations show the importance of using all-cause mortality to capture the true death toll due to the pandemic.
Γαληνός έγραψε: 25 Νοέμ 2020, 11:58 Article
Published: 14 October 2020
Magnitude, demographics and dynamics of the effect of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic on all-cause mortality in 21 industrialized countries
Vasilis Kontis, James E. Bennett, […]Majid Ezzati
Background
The COVID-19 pandemic and the policy responses to it can affect deaths from different diseases and injuries in adverse as well as beneficial ways, above and beyond deaths in those who are infected with SARS-CoV-2. We used 16 models to make estimates of how many people would have died had the pandemic not occurred and subtracted these from the actual observed number of deaths to measure the all-cause mortality effect of the first wave of the pandemic in 21 industrialized countries in a consistent and comparable manner.
Main Findings and Limitations
From mid-February through the end of May 2020, over 200,000 more people died in these 21 countries than would have had the pandemic not occurred. The total number of excess deaths, excess deaths per 100,000 people and relative increase in deaths were similar between men and women in most countries, which contrasts with the widely reported male disadvantage in deaths among those with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. The effect of the pandemic on total mortality was highly variable across countries. Bulgaria, New Zealand, Slovakia, Australia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Norway, Denmark and Finland avoided a detectable rise in all-cause mortality, contrasting with England and Wales and Spain, followed by Italy, Scotland and Belgium, where the all-cause death toll was very high.
Policy Implications
How the pandemic has affected all-cause mortality arises from the interactions of population and community characteristics, the immediate response to the pandemic and the resilience and preparedness of the public health and health and social care systems. As the pandemic continues, reducing the mortality toll requires both suppressing transmission—putting in place comprehensive and effective testing and contact tracing, timely provision of information to individuals and public health bodies, creating a sense of trust and responsibility and economic and social support to increase participation in testing, contact tracing and adherence to isolation advice—and integrated care pathways at the community and facility levels that manage COVID-19 cases and other acute and chronic conditions.
The first group of determinants comprises characteristics of individuals and communities that make them vulnerable or resilient to the spread and adverse health consequences of infection and those of the restrictions.
These include baseline demography and health; social networks and inequalities; employment status and occupation; and environmental features, such as transport and housing.
The risk of death from COVID-19 increases with age, with social and material deprivation and in the presence of long-term conditions such as obesity, diabetes and vascular and kidney diseases. Most countries in our analysis have an aging population, and none stands out as particularly older or younger than the others. For example, the share of the population that is older than 65 years ranges from 16% in Australia and New Zealand to 23% in Italy, but this share weakly correlated with excess mortality (correlation coefficient, 0.25) (Extended Data Table 4). Obesity and associated morbidities are higher in the United Kingdom, which experienced one of the highest effects, than in other European countries in our analysis27,28,29. But New Zealand and Australia, which had no detectable excess deaths, have an even higher prevalence of obesity than the United Kingdom, whereas Belgium, Italy and Spain, which have lower prevalence, also experienced large effects.
Similarly, although reported multi-morbidity varies across Europe30, it is not correlated with excess mortality: Sweden and Denmark, which had different magnitudes of excess deaths, have low levels of multi-morbidity; Hungary, Spain and Italy, which also span the entire range of excess mortality, have some of the highest. Finally, although the United Kingdom has higher relative poverty than countries such as Norway, Denmark and Finland31, excess deaths were higher in Sweden (similar relative poverty to Denmark and Finland) than in New Zealand (similar relative poverty to the United Kingdom). These findings suggest that these contextual factors, although important, are individually insufficient to lead to the massive cross-country variation in mortality observed here.
Other important population characteristics lack consistent data across countries and, hence, remain unexplored. For example, in some countries, regional outbreaks have started among low-wage workers in poor working conditions, such as garment factories and food processing plants. The role of overcrowded social housing complexes and public transportation (and, more generally, frequency, routes and means of mobility) in the extent and geographical distribution of transmission is also unknown32.
The second determinant of mortality toll of the pandemic is the policy and public health response, which has varied vastly across countries in timing, character and extent33.
The timing of the lockdown in relation to when initial infections occurred34 affects the peak number of people who are infected, which drives both the number of deaths from COVID-19 and the pressure on the healthcare system that displaces routine care for other diseases.
The stringency of the lockdown, together with the extent and effectiveness of testing, contract tracing and isolation, determines how long it takes for the number of cases to return to low levels and can therefore account for some of the variations in the intensity and duration of excess deaths observed here (Extended Data Table 4).
Among the countries analyzed here, Bulgaria, New Zealand, Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary, Norway and Finland acted early in terms of putting in place various movement restrictions or lockdowns33,35 and kept the number of cases to such low levels that they could identify and isolate cases and their contacts through their existing public health systems. Austria and Denmark experienced an early rise in the number of cases but enacted lockdowns soon after and used effective testing, contact tracing and isolation to contain the epidemic and its mortality effect. At the other extreme, Italy, which was the initial European epicenter of the pandemic, Spain, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom put lockdown measures in place only after the number of cases and deaths had risen to such levels that the epidemic continued for weeks. For example, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, France and the Netherlands introduced lockdowns after a larger number of cases had been detected and after a longer period since the first few COVID-19 deaths occurred than New Zealand and other countries in Europe, such as Denmark (Extended Data Table 4)33,34,36.
Sweden, the only country that did not put in place a mandatory lockdown and used only voluntary social distancing measures, had one of the longest durations of excess mortality. Extensive (and, at the extreme, universal) testing and effective contact tracing and isolation of cases and their contacts can also minimize transmission even without a lockdown37.
Countries also varied in how extensively they conducted community testing, contact tracing and isolation of cases and their contacts at each stage of the pandemic, with Austria, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and Norway introducing effective systems and Belgium, Spain, France and the United Kingdom being more limited in community testing and/or contact tracing for many months33, with some, like the United Kingdom, Spain and France, still not having a system that is able to respond to the dynamic geographical, demographic and social nature of the epidemic38,39,40.
Αυτά φαντάζουν ως ένα συμπαγές σετ παραγόντων, ικανών να αναλύσουν την πανδημία σε έναν ρεαλιστικό βαθμό.Third, the preparedness and resilience of the public health infrastructure not only influence how well the spread of infection is controlled but also influence the choice of policy, as decision-makers assess what they think is possible with existing capacity41.
Denmark and Austria (as well as Germany, for which data were not available for our analysis) were able to scale up testing rapidly because they had extensive and well-coordinated laboratory networks and public health infrastructure in place. Some central European countries had existing contact tracing infrastructure, a legacy of their more recent experience with infectious diseases such as tuberculosis.
Others had more limited capacity but were able to scale it up rapidly based on the existing public health structures, such as New Zealand’s contact tracing system. In contrast, the United Kingdom and Spain had limited testing capacity (or ability to use capacity in non-governmental labs) and contact tracing systems, early in the pandemic. As above, their testing, contact tracing and ability to persuade and support people to isolate when necessary are still not effective42,38,39,40.
Countries also varied substantially in terms of how their healthcare system continued to provide life-saving services: those countries that had less capacity and were less able to rapidly enhance capacity, partly related to uneven health and social care spending, responded less effectively to healthcare needs. Notably, per capita spending is lower in the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain than in Austria, Norway, Sweden and Denmark43. One effect of financing variation is on the number of hospital beds, which, on a per capita basis in Austria, is nearly three times that of the United Kingdom44. Where hospital beds are more limited—for example, in the United Kingdom, Spain and Hungary45—concerns about breeching capacity might have led to delaying admission of patients with COVID-19 and other patients until their health deteriorated and to early discharge of patients to long-term care facilities (care homes) often without systematic testing.
The spread of infection within and between hospitals and care homes, and between them and the community, is itself an important determinant of infections and deaths in both the vulnerable groups and the general population46,47. Where infection rates were high and care homes were not appropriately safeguarded—namely in Spain, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, France and Sweden—a large number of care home residents died from confirmed or probable COVID-1946. The initial seeding through discharge of infected patients to care homes was compounded by lack of testing and protective equipment for staff and residents and, especially in privately run care homes, regular movement of (temporary) staff across facilities48. Finally, some of the variations in excess deaths might be due to variation in community-based and primary care that affected preventive and pre-hospital care for patients with COVID-19 as well as for patients with other conditions.
Κάθε χώρα έχει διαφορετική κουλτούρα κατοίκων (κάποιες συγγενείς χώρες μπορεί προφανώς να ομοιάζουν), διαφορετική ηλιακή δομή και επίπεδα υγείας πολιτών, διαφορετική δυνατότητα για "έξυπνα" μέτρα, διαφορετικά προϋπάρχοντα συστήματα υγείας, διαφορετική ικανότητα για αποτελεσματικές αλλαγές εν μέσω κρίσιμης κατάστασης, διαφορετική στατιστική καταγραφή, κοκ.Although our results demonstrate that countries with timely lockdowns had smaller numbers of excess deaths in the first wave of the epidemic, lockdowns have adverse short- and long-term health, psychosocial and economic effects.
They might become needed, as a mechanism of last resort, as the number of cases increases, but they also require effective surveillance and agile operation, with sufficient geographical granularity to limit restrictions to as small an area as possible. Lockdowns, especially nationwide ones, can be avoided or be less stringent if countries can put in place comprehensive (and, in the extreme, universal) and effective testing and contact tracing systems; provide information to individuals and local public health bodies in a timely manner; create a sense of trust and responsibility; and put in place economic and social support that helps to increase participation in testing, contact tracing and adherence to isolation advice.
In addition to controlling transmission, there is a need for integrated care pathways at the community and facility level that manage both milder COVID-19 cases and allow other acute and chronic conditions to be rapidly and appropriately triaged and cared for in community facilities as well as in health and long-term care facilities. For some countries, this might involve a re-allocation and re-direction of care resources and, for others, where there has been chronic underinvestment in health and social care, the more challenging task of rebuilding public health and health and social care systems that serve their entire population41.
Δεν είναι. Αν έχεις ξεκληριστεί τους πιο αδύναμους την άνοιξη χρειάζεται κάποιο διαστημα για να "παραχθούν" νέοι αδυναμοι. Σε αυτο το διάστημα έχεις λιγότερους θανάτους. Είναι σίγουρο πχ (αν όντως είχαν γίνει όλα αυτά) ότι η Ιουδαία είχε σχεδόν μηδενική νηπιακή θνησιμότητα για 2-3 χρόνια μετά τη σφαγή των νηπίων από τον Ηρώδη.Green Dragon έγραψε: 25 Νοέμ 2020, 08:22Φαίνεται πάντως πως τελικά η αλήθεια βρισκόταν κάπου στην μέση, δηλαδή το καλοκαίρι ή μάλλον όσο έχει ζέστη μπορείς να είσαι ανοιχτός χωρίς ιδιαίτερα προβλήματα, το έκανε και η Σουηδία. Τον χειμώνα, χωρίς να έχεις αναπτύξει ανοσία αγέλης, δεν μπορείς. Τα δεδομένα της Σουηδίας είναι ξεκάθαρα και για τις δύο πιο πάνω διαπιστώσεις.Echelon έγραψε: 25 Νοέμ 2020, 08:15 Τελικά μετά από 10 ημέρες αφού δημιουργήθηκε το θέμα, μάθαμε αν η Σουηδία πράγματι εφαρμόζει σκληρό Lockdown; Εγώ διαβάζω κάτι περί συστάσεων για αποστάσεις συν απαγόρευση πώλησης αλκοόλ μετά τις 22:00 στα μπαρ, τα οποία παραμένουν ανοιχτά. Μιλάμε για ακραία μέτρα.
Μια παρατήρηση: Θεωρείστε δεδομένο ότι και στην Σουηδία, όπως σε όλες τις χώρες, γίνονται πολύ περισσότερα τεστς σε σχέση με το πρώτο κύμα. Δηλαδή αυτήν την στιγμή οι Σουηδοί εξακολουθούν να υπολείπονται σε πραγματικά κρούσματα της άνοιξης. Παρακολουθήστε τους θανάτους, είναι το πιο αξιόπιστο κριτήριο.
