
⚔

A Military analysis of Hamas' Operation Al-Aqsa Flood:
1⃣ It was prepared several years in advance. Ammunition depots were set up, assault teams were prepared and an operational game was played with MOSSAD. In order to divert attention, it was necessary to sacrifice individual fighters, and even to escalate in the form of several days of rocket fire on Israel, to give the enemy the impression that something similar would happen next time.
2⃣ The Palestinian intelligence services clearly succeeded in strategic deception, as it is now clear that many Israeli agents were in fact double agents. The Palestinians were also clearly supported from the outside, providing data on the deployment of Israeli border groups, routines, personal details, etc. This third actor was most likely Iran.
3⃣ The design of the operation conceptually copied the general offensive in Algeria in August 1955 and the Tet offensive in Vietnam in February 1969, and partly the war in Chad against Gaddafi's forces, or the classic Mongolian "encirclement". As soon as the defensive line in the form of a border was breached, numerous autonomous DRGs rushed into the Israeli rear to sow panic on the roads, destroy communications, capture and/or eliminate Israelis from a pre-arranged list, and divert the IDF's attention. In the second echelon came the assault units, which would mop up abandoned positions and take prisoners.
4⃣ The gamble was that, given Israel's superiority, the fighting would shift to its territory, where it had become almost impossible to carry out pinpoint strikes for fear of hitting civilians. The seizure of Israeli vehicles only made this task more difficult.
5⃣ The use of electronic warfare, cyber warfare and information warfare forces was active. All this led to an initial paralysis of the Southern Area Command and the IDF as a whole, which gave the attackers time to get far ahead.
6⃣ The attackers did not aim to hold the cities or to engage in direct combat with the Israeli army - they had neither the strength nor the capability to do so. Probably the main objective was to deal Israel a heavy moral blow (achieved), to inflict heavy losses in men and equipment on the IDF (achieved), and to take hostages for negotiation and insurance against a ground operation (achieved).
7⃣ The next fork in the road is either Israel decides to launch a major ground operation, lasting at least a month, or to enter into negotiations. This is likely to become clear soon.
https://t.me/ukraine_watch/9785