https://static.rusi.org/methodology-deg ... e-2024.pdf
Assessing the Extent of Failure (p. 7)
An assessment of Russian production demonstrates that, despite all the above
measures, efforts to curtail the Russian defence industry have thus far in aggregate
failed.
Russian artillery – the backbone of its battlefield successes – consumes vast
quantities of ammunition. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 2022, Russian
industry was producing a mere 250,000 rounds of 152 mm ammunition per year.
By the beginning of 2023, it had increased production to 1 million rounds per
year. Over the course of 2023, Russian production of 152 mm shells rose further,
so that the country expects to manufacture 1.325 million rounds in 2024.
Meanwhile, 122 mm artillery ammunition increased to an expected output of
800,000 rounds over 2024.20 The production of multiple launch rocket systems
(MLRS) started from a much lower base, but has increased at a faster rate. In
2023, Russian 122 mm Grad production was just 33,000 rounds, but in 2024,
production is on track to exceed 500,000 rounds. Similarly, 220 mm Uragan
rocket production was just 2,800 rounds in 2023, but is on track to reach 17,000
rounds in 2024, with a similar rate of increase anticipated into 2025. This
prioritisation of MLRS production is intended to compensate for shortages of
replacement barrels in 2025.
In addition, Russia has set about refilling and restoring the approximately 20%
of its pre-war munitions stockpile that was severely degraded. Combined with
munitions orders from Iran, Belarus, Syria and North Korea – also heavily
sanctioned – Russian overall munitions availability is likely to remain steady at
4 million munitions for 2024 and 2025. Despite efforts to curb this increase among
Ukraine’s international partners, Russia has continued to be able to import
nitrocellulose from Germany, Türkiye and Taiwan, and other precursors for
explosive energetics from around the world, to sustain this rapid expansion of
its munitions production.
A similar story can be told about Russia’s manufacture of long-range missiles.
One of the cruise missiles most widely employed by Russian forces during the
full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been the Kh-101. In 2021, prior to the full-
scale invasion, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) had a target of producing
350 of these missiles per year. Actual production was just 56 missiles. In 2022,
the Russian MoD set a target of producing 460 Kh-101s per year. By 2023, actual
production had reached 420 Kh-101s per year, not only dwarfing pre-war
production, but also closing the gap between Russia’s ambitions and its outputs.
At the beginning of 2023, Russia had approximately 50 9M723 ballistic missiles
left in stock. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia produced
approximately six of these missiles per month. Production has since more than
tripled, such that, despite using Iskanders throughout 2023, Russia began 2024
with 180 9M723 and 9M727 in stock.
Shahed-136 production, meanwhile, has similarly expanded drastically. Original
Iranian production rates were close to 40 per month. Between Russia and Iran,
current production of these munitions has surpassed 250 per month. Given
that all these munitions are critically dependent on US- and foreign-origin
microelectronics, these figures clearly demonstrate that sanctions and other
measures have entirely failed to slow production. Indeed, in some instances,
access to specific components has increased. When the Russian military began
to drop aerial bombs with UMPK glide kits, they were guided by Kometa-M
satellite navigation modules using antennae from the Irish company Taoglas.
Despite these components being identified early in 2023, Russia has not only
significantly increased production of Kometa-M, now using it across a number
of UAVs including Geran-2s, but has also developed an eight-antennae array for
the UMPK, doubling the number of Taoglas antennae used per system. The
Russian MoD assesses that the impact of Western sanctions on production of
key weapons systems has been to impose a 30% increase in the price of
microelectronic components. This is not trivial, but it is also manageable.
The picture of Russian armoured vehicle production is distorted by the volume
of equipment that the Russians can withdraw from storage and refurbish. For
example, Russia is producing approximately 1,500 tanks and 3,000 other armoured
fighting vehicles in 2024 and is set to produce a similar number in 2025.
Approximately 85% of these are vehicles refurbished from storage. Nevertheless,
the number of newly produced vehicles has also been rising. For example, the
Kurganmashzavod plant produced 100 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles during
Q1 2023. In Q2, this rose to 108 vehicles. In Q3, 120 BMP-3s rolled off the production
line and in Q4, 135 were produced. This increase may seem modest, but it shows
that Russia is steadily expanding production capacity. In some cases, this is
achieved by cutting corners and reprioritising. For example, in 2023, Russia
produced 728 Tigr-M, a rate that is anticipated to fall to 721 in 2024, while the
level of environmental protection from chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear threats on the vehicle is being reduced. This frees up capacity elsewhere.
There is also some substitution away from components sourced from the US
and Europe. Refurbished tanks, for example, had used Catherine thermal sights
made by Thales before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Refurbished tanks
today are instead fitted with Chinese- or Belarusian-supplied tank sights, which
are less capable, but adequate. Here, therefore, there has been some successful
import substitution. Ultimately, however, the refocusing on capability requires
changes to machine tools, and large volumes of these continue to flow to Russia
from the US, Europe, Taiwan and further afield, along with the software updates
to run them.
In summary, despite the diligent efforts of many civil servants, backed by the
political will to disrupt Russia’s military–industrial output, there is little to show
for it. The question arises as to why efforts so far have proven so ineffective.
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